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I. INTRODUCTION
[1] In October 2006, Andrew Fire and Craig Mello won the Nobel Prize
in Physiology or Medicine for discovering a process known as RNA
interference in the soil nematode Caenorhaditis elegans.1 More
commonly known as RNAi, this process has great therapeutic significance
for humans because of its ability to specifically and efficiently regulate
gene expression.2 The capacity to easily regulate gene expression will
tremendously impact our ability to combat a wide variety of disorders
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1
Nobelprize.org, The Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 2006,
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/2006 (last visited Sept. 15, 2008).
2
See generally Andrew Fire et al., Potent and Specific Genetic Interference by DoubleStranded RNA in Caenorhabditis Elegans, 391 NATURE 806 (1998) (describing discovery
of RNAi).
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ranging from cancer to infectious diseases.3 While the mechanism of
RNAi was first published within the last decade,4 three RNAi-based
human therapies are already in clinical trails.5
[2] In January 2008, just over one year after Fire and Mello’s discovery,
scientists at the J. Craig Venter Institute published a report describing the
first synthetically created bacterial genome.6 Synthetic biology, as the
technology is known, has the potential to create microorganisms capable
of producing inexpensive medical therapies, such as malarial vaccines, or
even environmentally friendly industrial materials.7 In addition to other
applications, research is currently underway to produce synthetic
organisms for use as highly efficient biofuels that would reduce the
environmental cost of producing such fuels.8
[3] RNAi and synthetic biology are seemingly diverse technologies;
however, these two technologies share a common necessity—gene patents.
Gene patents are essential to ensure that any useful application will result
from either of these technologies. Yet these emerging biotechnologies are
not the only applications requiring gene patents. Society has already
benefited enormously from gene patents. Biopharmaceutical drugs
(“biologics”) currently make up 40% of all preclinical candidates and 25%
3

See Charles X. Li et al., Delivery of RNA Interference, 5 CELL CYCLE 2103, 2103
(2006) (describing the versatility of RNAi).
4
Antonin de Fougerolles et al., Interfering with Disease: A Progress Report on siRNABased Therapeutics, 6 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 443 nn.1-2 (2007).
5
See id. at 451.
6
Daniel G. Gibson et al., Complete Chemical Synthesis, Assembly, and Cloning of a
Mycoplasma Genitalium Genome, 319 SCI. 1215, 1200 (2008), available at
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/rapidpdf/1151721v1.pdf (describing the creation of
synthetic genome).
7
See Sapna Kumar & Arti Rai, Synthetic Biology: The Intellectual Property Puzzle, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1745, 1746 (2007) (describing potential advantages of synthetic organisms
along with the unique intellectual property issues that would arise from their
advancement into mainstream biotechnology).
8
See also Lee R. Lynd et al., How Biotech Can Transform Biofuels, 26 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 169, 170 (2008) (discussing the benefits of biotechnology with respect
to increasing the “land fuel yield” for crops useful as biofuels). See generally Biodiesel
Times, Genome Transplant Biofuels and Synthetic Genomics, http://biodiesel.rainbarrel.net/genome-transplant-biofuels-and-synthetic-genomics (last visited Sept. 15,
2008).
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of all new drug submissions for U.S. market approval.9 Furthermore, the
biologics market is expanding at a rate far greater than the conventional
drug market.10 Research and development for both biologic and
conventional drug therapies is quite costly, as a single drug can cost up to
$1.7 billion to bring it to market.11 As a result, the limited period of
exclusivity afforded to patents is absolutely indispensable in providing the
necessary incentive to invest so heavily in the research and development
of most biologic drug therapies.12
[4] The promise of most biotechnologies could come to a screeching halt
with the adoption of proposed bipartisan legislation that would effectively
ban all gene patents. Introduced by Congressmen Xavier Becerra and
Dave Weldon, the Genomic Research and Accessibility Act (“GRAA”)
simply states that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, no patent
may be obtained for a nucleotide sequence, or its functions or correlations,
or the naturally occurring products it specifies.”13 Senator Becerra asserts
that “[g]ene patents interfere with research on diagnoses and cures.”14
Gene patents have also caught the imaginative eye of the public. In an oped for the New York Times, Michael Crichton asserts that “[g]ene patents
slow the pace of medical advance on deadly diseases,” and that “[y]ou, or
someone you love, may die because of a gene patent that should never
have been granted in the first place.”15 Some bioethicists have taken a
more academic approach by offering legal commentaries that explore the

9

See Stacy Lawrence, Pipelines Turn to Biotech, 25 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1342,
1342 (2007).
10
See Saurabh Aggarwal, What’s Fueling the Biotech Engine?, 25 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1097, 1097 (2007).
11
Liora Sukhatme, Deterring Fraud: Mandatory Disclosure and the FDA Drug Approval
Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1218 (2007).
12
See also Christopher J. Betti, Diagnostic Genetic Technologies Left Stranded on First
Base: A Need to Unwind the Protection Afforded Gene Patents, DUPAGE COUNTY BAR
ASS’N BRIEF, April 2005, 22, at 23; cf. Marcia Angell, Excess in the Pharmaceutical
Industry, 171 JAMC 1451, 1452 (2007).
13
Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, H.R. 977, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (1st Sess.
2007) [hereinafter GRAA].
14
See 153 CONG. REC. E315 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2007) (statement of Rep. Becerra), 2007
WL 433061.
15
Michael Crichton, Op-Ed., Patenting Life, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2007, at A23.
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legitimacy and subsequent effects of the issuance of gene patents.16
Prominent scientists have even jumped on the bandwagon.17 Although the
language scientists use does not intentionally evoke the societal fear and
paranoia that Crichton employs, both send the same message: gene patents
are bad and should not be permitted.18
[5] Despite the public outcry, critics ostensibly fail to apprehend gene
patents’ primary purpose and benefits. In line with this reasoning, there is
no convincing empirical evidence that gene patents are slowing the
progress of biomedical or commercial research.19 With respect to
diagnostic testing, a great deal of debate has focused on whether gene
patents unnecessarily increase the costs of such diagnostic tests.20 Yet,
many opponents of gene patents do not realize that patents that claim
methods for diagnosing human genetic disorders comprise only a fraction
of the total uses potentially employed by gene patents.21
[6] It would be extremely unfortunate if all the beneficial applications of
gene patents were compromised at the expense of an overly broad and
poorly drafted legislative bill that attempts to address a problem that is
overblown and presumptuous. Even if banning gene patents would
provide greater access to genetic diagnostic tests, which is itself a
questionable notion, what would be the use of knowing that you might
acquire a genetic condition if potential drug therapies to treat such
conditions were never realized as a result of that ban?
[7] If passed, the GRAA would be devastating to the progress of both
health care and possibly even the protection of the environment. A better
solution would be to pass infringement exemption legislation that only
16

See generally Lori B. Andrews & Jordan Paradise, Gene Patents: The Need for
Bioethics Scrutiny and Legal Change, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 403 (2005)
(arguing that gene patents raise bioethical concerns and thus require policy reform).
17
See, e.g., Who Owns Your Body, Nobel Laureate Opposes Gene Patents,
http://www.whoownsyourbody.org/sulston.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2008).
18
See, e.g., Andrews & Paradise, supra note 16, at 404 (“[P]atents for human genetic
material are an example of a bad policy that needs to be corrected.”).
19
See infra Parts III.A-B.
20
See infra Part III.C.
21
See infra Parts III.C, IV.B for a discussion pertaining to which types of inventions are
most commonly associated with gene patents.
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targets companies attempting to monopolize diagnostic testing for specific
genetic mutations, but without interfering with the commercial needs of
companies that plan to develop genome-wide genetic analyses utilizing
microchip array technologies.22 This solution is especially advantageous
in light of the technological paradigm shift currently underway from single
gene diagnostic testing to genome-wide genetic analyses.23 Such
legislation would avoid interfering with the innovative incentive provided
to biologic drug manufacturers as a result of gene patent protection, and
would more appropriately address the issues associated with genetic
diagnostic tests.
[8] The purpose of this article is to examine current United States patent
law and policy with respect to gene patents, and to argue that the benefits
of gene patents far outweigh any disadvantages. Aside from so-called
moral opposition against gene patents, which rarely amounts to any
meaningful proposals of reform,24 more commonsensical arguments
against gene patents can be divided into two broad categories. First,
opponents of gene patents assert that genetic material simply is not
patentable subject matter under current U.S. patent law. Second, even if
genes are patentable subject matter, critics assert that policy concerns
dictate that genetic material should not be patented because of the adverse
effects such patents may have. Part II of this article discusses the
patentability of genetic material under current U.S. patent law. Part III
examines the policies that maintain that gene patents hinder research or
prevent reasonable access to genetic diagnostic tests.
Part IV
demonstrates how gene patents have already benefited society by
encouraging the development of biologic drug therapies. Finally, Part V
reveals that emerging biotechnologies, including yet-to-be-discovered
biotechnologies, will fail to materialize without the acceptance of gene
patents.

22

See infra Part III.C for a discussion pertaining to legislation that more appropriately
targets issues relating to genetic testing.
23
Arun Kalyanasundaram et al., Genomics, Haplotypes and Cardiovascular Disease,
FUTURE CARDIOLOGY, Dec. 17, 2007, available at
http://www.futuremedicine.com/doi/pdf/10.2217/14796678.3.6.601.
24
See Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human Gene
Patenting Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1091, 1091 (2006).
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II. GENETIC COMPOSITIONS ARE PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER UNDER
CURRENT U.S. PATENT LAW
[9] Before addressing the more pertinent debate as to whether policy
considerations should require legislative action that would preclude gene
patents, the standards associated with the patentability of genetic
compositions under current U.S. law warrant discussion. This part will
provide a brief synopsis of the two most controversial patentability
requirements for gene patents: novelty and utility.
A. WHAT IS A GENE PATENT?
[10] As advances in molecular biology have provided greater insight into
the complexities of the cellular processes facilitated by macromolecules
such as deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”), it has become increasingly
challenging to accurately define a gene.25 A generally acceptable
scientific definition of a gene is “[a] locatable region of genomic
sequence, corresponding to a unit of inheritance, which is associated with
regulatory regions, transcribed regions and/or other functional sequence
regions.”26
[11] The phrase “gene patent” does not have any legal basis, but is rather
a term used mostly by commentators who address the legitimacy of such
patents. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)
asserts that a patent may contain claims directed towards an isolated and
subsequently purified genetic composition.27 As far as the USPTO is
concerned, however, a genetic composition is broader than the scientific
definition of a gene. Nucleic acids are the building blocks of both DNA
and ribonucleic acid (“RNA”),28 and a polynucleotide is basically any
DNA or RNA sequence.29 In practice, patents have been issued for
25

See Helen Pearson, What is a Gene?, 441 NATURE 399, 399 (2006) (noting that
defining what a gene is has become more difficult as scientists further the knowledge of
molecular genetics).
26
Id. at 401.
27
Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001).
28
See MedicineNet.com, http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=4594
(last visited Sept. 15, 2008), for a basic definition of nucleic acid.
29
See Answers.com, http://www.answers.com/topic/polynucleotide?cat=health (last
visited Sept. 15, 2008), for a basic definition of polynucleotide
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polynucleotides that correspond to “a full-length protein encoding gene, a
gene fragment, a regulatory region, a cDNA molecule, or a genomic
region of unknown function.”30 Furthermore, patented polynucleotides
may be either isolated or recombinant.31 Accordingly, this article will
generically refer to a gene patent as a patent that contains claims directed
toward a genetic composition that encompasses any polynucleotide
sequence, or toward methods that utilize such a composition.32 This
distinction is important considering that the GRAA’s definition of what
should be prevented from patenting includes any nucleotide sequence.33
B.

ISOLATED AND PURIFIED GENETIC COMPOSITIONS ARE NOT
NATURALLY OCCURRING

[12] Gene patent critics have asserted that genes are products of nature,
and therefore do not deserve patent protection;34 however, the debate as to
whether products of nature should be patented existed well before the
emergence of gene patents.
[13] The landmark case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty35 was the first
Supreme Court decision to address whether bioengineered organisms
could be patented. In 1972, Ananda Chakrabarty filed a patent application
containing claims directed towards a genetically engineered bacterium
capable of breaking down crude oil.36 Such bacteria do not exist in nature,
and were thought to have significant use for treating oil spills.37 The
30

See Christopher M. Holman, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on Innovation and
Access: A Survey of Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REV. 295, 312
(providing examples of issued patents that claim a variety of different forms of genetic
compositions); see infra Parts II.B-C (discussing the patentability of genetic
compositions).
31
Holman, supra note 30, at 311.
32
See id. at 312, for a comprehensive description of gene patents.
33
GRRA, H.R. 977, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (1st Sess. 2007).
34
Andrews & Paradise, supra note 16, at 405; Oskar Liivak, The Forgotten Originality
Requirement: A Constitutional Hurdle for Gene Patents, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 261, 263 (2005); Stephanie Arcuri, Note, They Call That Natural? An Analysis of
the Term “Naturally Occurring” and the Application of Genes to the Patent Act, 40 VAL.
U. L. REV. 743, 746 (2006); Crichton, supra note 15, at A23.
35
447 U.S. 303 (1980).
36
Id. at 305-06.
37
Id. at 305.

7

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XV, Issue 1

patent examiner rejected the claims, asserting that microorganisms are
“products of nature,” and that living things are not patentable subject
matter.38 The decision of the Court, which arguably provided a legal
foundation from which the biotechnology industry has advanced,39 held
that Chakrabarty’s live, human-made microorganism was the “result of
human ingenuity and research,”40 and thus should be considered
patentable subject matter.41 In determining that genetically modified
bacteria are patentable, the Court provided its now infamous declaration
that “Congress intended statutory subject matter to ‘include anything
under the sun that is made by man.’”42
[14]
Isolated and purified compositions are not excluded from
patentability either. In 1970, hormones isolated and purified from human
prostate glands were held to exist in a state not found in nature, and were
therefore found to be patentable because the isolated and purified
hormones were not considered “naturally occurring.”43 In fact, isolated
and purified compositions have been considered novel for almost a
century—extracted adrenaline was held to be patentable in 1912.44 In
determining that extracted adrenaline was patentable, Judge Learned Hand
asserted that “an extracted product without change,” even lacking
subsequent purification, is worthy of patent protection.45 The USPTO
applies this rationale to gene patents, maintaining that a genetic
composition is not automatically precluded from patent protection as long
as the composition is “isolated from its natural state and processed through
purifying steps that separate the gene from other molecules naturally
associated with it.”46
38

Id. at 306.
See Terri A. Jones, Note, Patenting Transgenic Animals: When the Cat’s Away, the
Mice Will Play, 17 VT. L. REV. 875, 883-84 (1993) (noting that the Chakrabarty decision
accelerated commercial biotechnology innovation).
40
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313.
41
Id. at 309-10.
42
Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2394, 2399).
43
In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1401 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
44
Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford & Co., 196 F. 496, 499 (2d Cir. 1912), aff’g 189
F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911).
45
Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d,
196 F. 496 (1912).
46
Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1093.
39
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[15] Despite almost a hundred years of legislative history and judicial
precedent, some commentators still insist that claiming a purified and
isolated gene is not novel, but is a “trick of claim drafting” that
More
circumvents a proper interpretation of U.S. patent law.47
specifically, these arguments posit that an isolated and purified gene
sequence is simply a copy of the naturally occurring sequence, and thus
lacks originality.48 Still, it must be remembered that gene patents are not
permitted simply for “sequence data that represent genes as they naturally
occur within human chromosomes.”49 Rather, a genetic composition is
only patentable if it is useful as a “pharmaceutical drug, screening assay,
or other application.”50
C. STRICT UTILITY REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET IN ORDER TO OBTAIN
PATENT PROTECTION FOR GENETIC COMPOSITIONS
[16] Even if isolated and purified genetic compositions are eligible to
meet the novelty standard of U.S. patent law, such compositions must also
have utility (i.e., be useful) in order to procure patent protection.
Questions as to whether the current utility standard was sufficient, in light
of the technology associated with genomic sequencing, arose in the course
of two notable events in the 1990s.
[17] In 1992, Dr. Craig Venter51 applied for three gene patents for 6,800
expressed sequence tags (“ESTs”).52 ESTs are short segments of DNA
that represent portions of expressed genes, and may be useful for example,

47

Liivak, supra note 34, at 263-64.
Id. at 264.
49
James Bradshaw, Gene Patent Policy: Does Issuing Gene Patents Accord with the
Purposes of the U.S. Patent System? 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 637, 648 (2001)
(discussing further requirements beyond mere copying of a gene’s sequence that provides
for some genetic compositions to be patentable as a result of no longer being naturally
occurring).
50
Id. at 648-49.
51
Craig Venter was the founder of commercially-based Celera Genomics that competed
with the federally funded Human Genome Project to complete the sequencing of the
human genome. Jonathan Kahn, What’s the Use? Law and Authority in Patenting
Human Genetic Material, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 417, 420 (2003).
52
See id. at 420.
48
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to map which sequences in a genome are protein coding genes.53
Although these applications were ultimately withdrawn, Venter
subsequently applied for patents that covered over 20,000 genetic
compositions as CEO of Celera Genomics.54 In doing so, Venter asserted
that the patents would be used to later diagnose genetic disorders.55 The
USPTO denied his applications with the implication that simply finding a
gene sequence without an established utility does not merit patent
protection.56
[18] The increased desire for more stringent utility requirements was the
result of incidences of opportunistic protection of subsequently discovered
uses for some gene patents. For example, in 1995, Human Genome
Sciences (“HGS”) filed an application for a gene known as HDGNR10.57
HGS made rather generic claims regarding the utility of its gene: it is
useful for “identifying [receptor] antagonists and agonists.”58 What HGS
did not know at the time, but was discovered the following year by
scientists at the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”), was that the protein
encoded by the gene, named CCR5 by the NIH scientists, was identified as
a receptor essential for HIV infection.59 Although HGS was unaware of
the true utility of its gene at the time of filing, HGS now enjoys the
exclusive right to license the patent to another biotechnology company
that is using the CCR5 protein product in an effort to develop an HIV
vaccine.60

53

National Center for Biotechnology Information, Just the Facts: A Basic Introduction to
the Science Underlying NCBI Resources,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/est.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2008).
54
See Kahn, supra note 51.
55
See iBrief, The Fate of Gene Patents Under the New Utility Guidelines, DUKE L. &
TECH. REV., Feb 28, 2001, ¶ 5 (2001).
56
Id.
57
See Mattias Luukkonen, Gene Patents: How Useful Are the New Utility
Requirements?, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 337, 338 (2001).
58
Sean C. Pippen, Dollars and Lives: Finding Balance in the Patent “Gene Utility”
Doctrine, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 193, 195 (2006) (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,205,154
abstract (filed June 6, 1995)).
59
Id. at 195-96; see also Luukkonen, supra note 57, at 338 (stating that CCR5 is encoded
as an “essential” co-receptor for HIV).
60
See Luukkonen, supra note 57; see Pippen, supra note 588, at 196.
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[19] As a result of these events, and in response to criticism that gene
patents were being granted too liberally,61 the USPTO issued new Utility
Examination Guidelines (“Guidelines”) in January 2001.62
The
Guidelines increased the utility standard for gene patents,63 and provided
that an invention is useful only if it has a “well-established utility.”64 This
requires the genetic composition’s utility to be “specific, substantial, and
credible.”65
[20] The more stringent utility requirements promulgated by the
Guidelines forced stricter examination of patents, allowing only the
patenting of useful genetic compositions as required by patent policy.
Thus, ESTs must now have a “real world” utility,66 and will not satisfy the
well-established utility requirement put forth by the Guidelines if those
ESTs are only useful, for example, as “probes, chromosome markers, or
other research tools.”67 Additionally, the Guidelines will function to
substantially limit opportunistic patenting that is similar to the approach of
the HGS scientists.
[21] Although the Guidelines stopped short of clearly defining what
requirements a genetic composition must meet to be useful,68 the
Guidelines ultimately corroborated the USPTO’s intent to issue patents
claiming genetic compositions under requisite circumstances.69 This
corroboration is based on the USPTO’s conclusion that current patent law
does not prohibit gene patents.70 It should be acknowledged, however,
that the Guidelines are just that—guidelines that patent examiners should
follow when determining whether an invention meets the utility
requirement.

61

See Kahn, supra note 51, at 421.
Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1092.
63
See Melissa E. Horn, DNA Patenting and Access To Healthcare: Achieving the
Balance Among Competing Interests, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 253, 257 (2003).
64
Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1098.
65
Id.
66
iBrief, supra note 55, ¶ 28.
67
Id. ¶ 20.
68
See Pippen, supra note 58, at 205.
69
Horn, supra note 63, at 257; iBrief, supra note 55, ¶ 2.
70
Cf. Pippen, supra note 58, at 204.
62
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[22] The Guidelines are not law, and the USPTO clearly acknowledges
this fact.71
Nonetheless, the Guidelines have been substantially
indoctrinated into common law, most notably with the Federal Circuit’s
2005 In re Fisher72 decision. This decision pertained to a rejected patent
application that claimed ESTs that correspond to certain maize genes.73
The inventor was unaware of the precise structure or function of the genes
encoded by the claimed ESTs when he filed the patent application.74
Despite this lack of functional knowledge, the inventor argued that the
uses of the ESTs were not related to the functions of the underlying genes,
but could be used as a research tool comparable to a “microscope.”75
While the court acknowledged that the Guidelines were not binding in its
decision,76 the court essentially endorsed the Guidelines in determining
that Fisher’s ESTs did not have any real world utility based on an asserted
“specific and substantial” use.77
[23] With respect to current U.S. patent law regarding gene patents, as
long as an inventor isolates and subsequently purifies a genetic
composition, and can further show that the composition has a non-obvious
real world use, the USPTO will issue a patent.78 Furthermore, the judicial
branch has not interpreted current U.S. patent law as a prohibition against
gene patents.79 Thus, this article will proceed with the presupposition that
genetic compositions are patentable subject matter.
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS STIR THE GENE PATENT DEBATE
[24] As discussed above, genetic compositions are patentable subject
matter under current U.S. patent law, and there does not appear to be any
indication that such practices will cease without legislative action.
71

Id. at 193.
421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
73
Id. at 1368.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 1373.
76
Id. at 1372.
77
Id. at 1373; Recent Case, Patent Law—Utility—Federal Circuit Holds That Expressed
Sequence Tags Lack Substantial and Specific Utility Unless Underlying Gene Function is
Identified—In Re Fisher, 421 F.3D 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 119 HARV. L. REV. 2604, 2605
(2006).
78
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
79
See Holman, supra note 30, at 296.
72
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Accordingly, as opposed to questioning the legitimacy of gene patents
under the standards of current U.S. patent law, the more relevant question
is whether policy arguments that take into account the actual consequences
of such patents require action limiting patent protection for genetic
compositions.
[25] This article argues that not only should policy concerns prevent a ban
on gene patents, but that policy considerations actually favor gene patents.
Nonetheless, concerns of the possible negative effects of gene patents
deserve recognition in order to demonstrate the unsubstantiated trepidation
associated with such concerns. Two common arguments exist regarding
policy justifications that question gene patents. The first argument asserts
that gene patents impede basic or biomedical research and/or commercial
innovation. Not only will this section demonstrate that this argument is
largely unsupported, but it will also show that such concerns are being
unfairly waged against gene patents and are applicable to many types of
patents. The second argument in favor of a ban against gene patents
asserts that such patents prevent reasonable access to diagnostic testing of
genetic disorders.
A. GENE PATENTS DO NOT RESTRAIN BASIC OR BIOMEDICAL
RESEARCH
[26] Whereas proponents of gene patents contend that such patents
encourage innovation,80 some critics maintain that gene patents interfere
with research and development, and are therefore contrary to patent
policy.81 Such criticisms are largely based on anecdotal evidence gathered
80

Id. See generally David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The
Mismeasure of Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1677 (2007)
(providing an empirical demonstration that gene patents are not hindering innovation).
81
See 153 CONG. REC. E315 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2007) (statement of Rep. Becerra), 2007
WL 433061; John F. Merz et al., Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test, 415 NATURE 577, 577
(2002); Byron V. Olsen, The Biotechnology Balancing Act: Patents For Gene Fragments,
and Licensing the “Useful Arts,” 7 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 295, 334 (1997); Jordan
Paradise, European Opposition to Exclusive Control Over Predictive Breast Cancer
Testing and the Inherent Implications for U.S. Patent Law and Public Policy: A Case
Study of the Myriad Genetics’ BRCA Patent Controversy, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 133, 149
(2004); Horn, supra note 63, at 282; Crichton, supra note 15, at A23. See generally Lori
B. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma: Balancing Commercial Incentives with Health

13

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XV, Issue 1

from one third-party survey that sought to determine the full range of
genetic data withheld by academic geneticists.82 The conclusion that gene
patents interfere with basic research is based on observations that 21% of
surveyed researchers withheld data in order to protect commercial
interests in their research.83 Yet, as soon as a university researcher
becomes interested in commercializing his or her research, that research is
clearly no longer basic academic research. The survey relied upon,
however, is silent as to whether the researchers who were actually
prevented from obtaining information or materials because of commercial
interests were themselves basic researchers with no commercial
ambitions.84 It is necessary to address this omission before concluding
that such data signifies a hindrance on noncommercial biomedical
research. Furthermore, it is important to note that the survey was not even
unique to gene patents, as it noted that “geneticists were no more likely
than other life scientists to report that their requests were denied.”85
[27] The true test of whether gene patents are hindering noncommercial
biomedical research is to examine whether biomedical researchers without
commercial interests are prevented from acquiring materials, not whether
researchers with commercial interests are withholding materials. Recent
surveys of biomedical researchers in universities, government, and
nonprofit institutions questioned whether patents could be blamed for
blocked access to biomedical research materials.86 These surveys found
that while access to research materials at times may be restricted, “the
patent status of the requested material had no significant effect” on why
those materials were restricted.87 In fact, none of those surveyed declared
that third-party patents stopped their research and only 1% stated that
research was delayed as a result of another party’s patent.88 The survey
Needs, 2 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 65, 79-81 (2002) (arguing that the rationales that
are appropriate for granting patents for some products do not apply to gene patents).
82
See generally Eric G. Campbell et al., Data Withholding in Academic Genetics:
Evidence from a National Survey, 287 JAMA 473 (2002) (surveying to what degree and
for what reasons geneticists withhold sharing information and materials).
83
Id. at 478 fig.
84
Id. at 473.
85
Id. at 474.
86
See John P. Walsh et al., View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309
SCI. 2002, 2002 (2005).
87
Id. at 2003.
88
Id. at 2002.
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authors concluded that their “results offer little empirical basis for claims
that restricted access to IP is currently impeding biomedical research.”89
Accordingly, there is a paucity of compelling evidence gathered from
surveys of basic biomedical researchers that gene patents specifically
interfere with strictly academic research.90
[28] If gene patents are not dissuading academic investigators who
engage strictly in basic research from sharing or receiving data and
materials, could researchers nonetheless be held liable if their research
infringes upon another’s gene patent? It is appropriate to note that patent
law does not always prohibit use of a patented invention. There is a
common law exception from infringement, known as the experimental use
exception, which provides relief from patent infringement if the conduct is
“merely for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining
the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects.”91 The
experimental use exception has frequently been applied to academic
researchers and institutions.92
[29] The two-century-old experimental use exception has become even
narrower in recent years,93 leaving many academic researchers to question
whether their activities might leave them liable for infringement.94 In
2002, the Federal Circuit held in Madey v. Duke95 that the experimental
use exception did not apply to a private research university96 despite the
89

Id. at 2003.
See generally id., which demonstrates the failure of biomedical researcher surveys to
provide conclusive proof that gene patenting significantly interferes with strictly
academic non-commercial research.
91
Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813).
92
See Michael S. Mireles, Adoption of the Bayh-Dole Act in Developed Countries: Added
Pressure For a Broad Research Exemption in the United States? 59 ME. L. REV. 259,
277-78 (2007).
93
See generally Elizabeth A. Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent
Infringement: Do Universities Deserve Special Treatment?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 92223 (2006) (discussing the possible impact of Madey v. Duke Univ.).
94
See generally Amy Yancey & C. Neal Stewart, Jr., Are University Researchers at Risk
for Patent Infringement?, 25 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1225 (2007) (discussing the
notion that the traditional practice of ignoring patents by university researchers with no
commercial interests might nonetheless leave such researchers liable for infringement).
95
Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
96
See Rowe, supra note 93, at 944-45.
90
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fact that the university was not directly involved in any commercial
ventures related to the patented invention.97 The reasoning behind this
controversial decision was that noncommercial research still advances the
university’s educational mission to “increase the status of the institution
and lure lucrative research grants, students and faculty.”98
[30] Although it may be advantageous to retain a broad experimental use
exception for public sector researchers,99 it is still unclear how the Madey
decision will affect academic researcher’s ability to use the experimental
use exception as a defense against infringement.100 Some have argued that
a de facto experimental use exception nonetheless applies to precommercialization researchers.101 The reasoning behind this notion is that
patent holders are unlikely to even be aware of early stage infringing
activities taking place among academics, and even if they were aware,
“the damages would prove too small to justify the cost of litigation.”102
[31] Legislation that failed to pass would have protected noncommercial
research against infringement of a gene patent.103 The Genomic Research
and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002 (“GRDAA of 2002”)104
provided two provisions that exempted individuals from infringement of
gene patents.105 One provision that pertained to diagnostic tests is
discussed below.106 The other provision would have provided an
97

Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362-63.
Id. at 1362.
99
See David C. Hoffman, Note, A Modest Proposal: Toward Improved Access to
Biotechnology Research Tools by Implementing A Broad Experimental Use Exception, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1039 (2004) (arguing that an expansive experimental use
exception applied only to public sector researchers would permit noncommercial use of
reagents for when equivalent substitutes are unavailable).
100
Yancey & Stewart, supra note 94, at 1227.
101
See Rowe, supra note 93, at 950.
102
Id.
103
See Gregory P. Lekovic, Article: Genetic Diagnosis and Intellectual Property Rights:
A Proposal to Amend "The Physician Immunity Statute", 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. &
ETHICS 275, 296-97 (2004) (discussing the legislative history of the Genomic Research
and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002).
104
Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002, H.R. 3967, 107th Cong.
(2002).
105
See also Betti, supra note 12, at 25-26 (discussing congressional action that would
alleviate issues surrounding gene patents and diagnostic testing).
106
See infra Part III.C.
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exemption from infringement for those that used patented genetic
technologies for noncommercial research purposes;107 however, the
legislation never passed.108 Nonetheless, as long as an academic
researcher has no commercial intentions, it is extremely unlikely, though
not impossible, that an academic researcher will find herself in court for
infringing a gene patent. At any rate, contentions that gene patents are
compromising basic academic research are overstated and not even
exclusively based on gene patents.109
B. GENE PATENTS ARE NOT COMPROMISING COMMERCIAL INNOVATION
[32] The next concern to address is whether gene patents interfere with
innovation when commercialization factors into the equation. Since the
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, academic researchers have been
able to commercialize their research efforts despite funding from the
government.110 The purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act was “to promote the
utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or
development.”111 The fact that academic researchers can patent and
subsequently license inventions has raised concerns that the public must
pay twice for innovation: first through the taxes that funded the research,
and then for the high prices enabled by the patent rights.112 Similar
arguments have been raised in regard to gene patents, due to the fact that
the Human Genome Project was publicly funded.113 These claims are only
convincing if “the patent arising from the federal funding effectively
covers the eventual product that will be brought to market.”114 As this
article will demonstrate, most commercialized innovations arising from
gene patents are biologic drug therapies that are so far removed
107

See Betti, supra note 12, at 25-26.
Id. at 25.
109
See Campbell, supra note 82, at 478; see supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
110
35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000); see In re Roche Molecular Sys., 516 F.3d 1003, 1008
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The Bayh-Dole Act is intended to promote
investment by the private sector in commercialization of federally funded research
discoveries for the public good.”).
111
35 U.S.C. § 200.
112
See Sean M. O’Connor, Intellectual Property Rights and Stem Cell Research: Who
Owns the Medical Breakthroughs?, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 665, 685 (2005).
113
Andrews & Paradise, supra note 16, at 406.
114
O’Connor, supra note 112, at 685.
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downstream from the gene discovery phase that public fears of having to
pay twice are substantially unwarranted. 115
[33] The concerns that gene patents reduce commercial innovation are not
exclusive to academic researchers that desire to commercialize their
research. Public sector researchers that must compete with the intellectual
property rights of for-profit corporations, and even the established
biotechnology companies themselves, share such concerns. A growing
concern among intellectual property commentators arises from what is
known as the “tragedy of the anticommons.”116 An intellectual property
anticommons is created by patent thickets117 that allow multiple patent
owners to each have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource so
that no one individual has an effective privilege of use.118 Accordingly,
technologies requiring many patented components are usually more
susceptible to anticommons effects. Patent thickets generally raise
concerns that resulting anticommons will block innovation because of “the
cost of bringing downstream technologies to market.”119 It is argued that
such costs are caused by each upstream patent holder setting up
“tollbooths” of high bargaining costs and licensing fees, which
subsequently slow the pace of downstream innovation.120
[34] One area that has prompted concerns regarding patent thickets is
agricultural biotechnology. To exemplify, Golden Rice is a genetically
modified crop that has significantly elevated levels of vitamin A because

115

See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998) (describing how the
“tragedy of the commons” metaphor helps to explain an “anticommons” in which
resources are underused as a result of blocking patents).
117
The phrase “patent thickets” is often used either interchangeably, or in conjunction
with, the phrase “tragedy of the anticommons.” See Kenneth Neil Cukier, Navigating the
Future(s) of Biotech Intellectual Property, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 249, 250 (2006);
Yancey & Stewart, supra note 94, at 1225-26.
118
See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 116, at 698.
119
Yancey & Stewart, supra note 94, at 1225-26.
120
Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing The Double Helix: A Novel
and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV 303,
418 (2002); see Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 116, at 698-99.
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of the transgenic expression of beta-carotene.121 There is a prediction that
the impact of Golden Rice could save millions of lives annually in the
developing world.122 The development of Golden Rice required an
astonishingly large array of patent-protected technologies; it called for
seventy patent-protected technologies belonging to over thirty public and
private sector entities.123 Fortunately, these patent-holding entities
cooperated by offering free licenses in order to promote distribution of the
crop to the developing world.124 Still, it is uncertain at this time whether
similar patent holders will be as cooperative in sharing other agricultural
biotechnologies intended for food security in the developing world.125
[35] In regard to human gene patents, critics have warned that gene patent
thickets will “increase the costs of genetic diagnostics, slow the
development of new medicines, stifle academic research, and discourage
investment in downstream R&D.”126 The United States has patented onefifth of human genes, according to one study.127 This has prompted gene
patent opponents, including Congressman Becerra, to claim that one-fifth
of your genome is “owned” by someone else.128 Unfortunately, such
121

See generally Jacqueline A. Paine et al., Improving the Nutritional Value of Golden
Rice Through Increased Pro-Vitamin A Content, 23 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 482
(2005) (describing the preferential accumulation of beta-carotene in rice through the
transgenic expression of the phytoene synthase gene from maize in combination with the
Erwinia uredovora carotene desaturase gene).
122
See Stanley P. Kowalski & R. David Kryder, Golden Rice: A Case Study in
Intellectual Property Management and International Capacity Building, 13 RISK 47, 5152 (2002).
123
See Ronald P. Cantrell et al., The Impact of Intellectual Property on Nonprofit
Research Institutions and the Developing Countries They Serve, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI. &
TECH. 253, 269 (2004).
124
Id. at 270; see Remigius N. Nwabueze, What Can Genomics and Health
Biotechnology Do For Developing Countries?, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 369, 394
(2005).
125
See Gregory C. Ellis, Intellectual Property Rights and the Public Sector: Why
Compulsory Licensing of Protected Technologies Critical for Food Security Might Just
Work in China, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 699, 708 (2007) (raising concerns that China’s
public sector agricultural biotechnology industry might be disadvantaged because of
foreign competition resulting from China’s strengthening intellectual property laws).
126
Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome,
310 SCI. 239, 239 (2005).
127
Id.
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153 CONG. REC. E315 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2007) (statement of Rep. Becerra), 2007 WL
433061; see also Crichton, supra note 15, at A23.
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estimates are significantly overstated.129 Because human gene patents
may include a variety of functional uses from simple gene fusions to
complex hybridization arrays, it is improper to assume each patent
claiming a human genetic composition confers ownership to that
respective human gene.130 In fact, the abovementioned study showed that
some genes have as many as twenty patents attributed to that one gene’s
sequence.131 Anxieties of having “one-fifth” of your genome “owned” are
further undermined by the fact that there have only been six lawsuits
alleging infringement of a human gene patent as identified in the
aforementioned study.132
[36] Apart from the fact that many human genes comprise sequences that
the United States claims through patents, there is limited empirical
evidence that gene patents adversely affect innovation.133 For example, a
recent empirical study ultimately challenges the “the widely held belief
that the rapid growth in biotechnology patenting over the last decade is
impeding innovation.”134 The study argues that simply counting patents
leads to false predictions and unrealistic expectations.135 Instead, the
authors examined “investigations of broad patent trends, patterns of patent
ownership, and the distribution of patents across PTO patent
subclasses.”136 The results showed a continuous entry of new patent
owners, that biotechnology patents were diffuse among owners, and
biotechnology patent applications were rising.137 As a result, the authors
concluded that “overall biotechnology innovation is not being impaired by
the growth in patents issued each year.”138 For now, while the thicket of
gene patents may be increasing, the resulting anticommons has not yet
become tragic. Moreover, concerns of slowed innovation because of
patent thickets are not exclusive to gene patents as there are also
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See Holman, supra note 30, at 299.
See id. at 315-16.
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Jensen & Murray, supra note 126, at 239.
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See Caulfield, supra note 24, at 1093-94.
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135
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predictions that there will be slowed innovation of semiconductors and
software.139
C. GENE PATENTS AND DIAGNOSTIC TESTS
[37] The increased cost of tests, which could indicate increased
susceptibility to genetic disorders, is the most widely acknowledged
negative effect of gene patents. 140 Although there is almost no empirical
data that genetic tests, or the clinical knowledge resulting from them, are
negatively affected by gene patents,141 nonetheless, such tests could be
desirable in order to determine susceptibility to various genetic
disorders.142 Additionally, genetic tests will have increased use in the
future as a way to create personalized medicine that will determine which
drugs will be most efficacious for individual patients.143 The poster child
example of a gene patent’s supposed detriment to society that has sparked
intense public debate derives from patents owned by a Utah biotechnology
company known as Myriad Genetics (“Myriad”).
[38] Myriad owns patents that relate to methods and materials used to
isolate and detect a gene known as BRCA1 that confers higher
susceptibility to breast and ovarian cancer.144 Women who carry a germline mutation of BRCA1 have an approximately 85% risk of developing
breast cancer and a 60% risk of developing ovarian cancer over the course
of their lifetime.145 Myriad also holds patents to another breast cancer
susceptibility gene known as BRCA2. The patents to these two genes
have allowed Myriad to develop diagnostic tests to detect cancer-causing
mutations in the two genes.146 Many opponents of gene patents find it
egregious that Myriad charges up to $3,000 to test for mutations in these
139

See Yancey & Stewart, supra note 94, at 1226.
See Betti, supra note 12, at 25; cf. Roger D. Klein, Gene Patents and Genetic Testing
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See id.
142
See id. at 990.
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See generally Dan Jones, Steps on the Road to Personalized Medicine, 6 NATURE
REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 770 (2007) (demonstrating how genetic data can be used to
determine patients’ response to drug therapies).
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two genes.147 This is about three times as much as other labs could charge
notwithstanding Myriad’s patents.148 For these reasons, commentators
have asserted that gene patents “impede access to appropriate health care
and violate individual rights,”149 or that gene patents “counter[] the goals
of the healthcare system.”150
[39] Solutions have been offered to remedy unnecessarily expensive
diagnostic tests for genetic disorders. One solution is a limited
infringement exemption, which was likely modeled after the surgical use
exemption151 and was included in the previously discussed GRDAA of
2002 that failed to pass.152 In addition to exemption from infringement for
noncommercial research, the GRDAA of 2002 would have also exempted
a health care provider against infringement for noncommercial diagnostic
testing of genetic disorders.153
[40] The GRDAA of 2002 is not as ideal as it first appears. First, some
commentators have voiced concern that the medical procedure exemption
has resulted in undeveloped medical procedures.154 Because the GRDAA
of 2002 was modeled after the medical procedure exemption, similar
concerns of undeveloped innovation may occur with diagnostic genetic
tests.
Second, such legislation does not take into consideration
commercial DNA array technology, which has been pioneered by the
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biotechnology company Affymetrix.155 DNA arrays allow the screening
of hundreds of gene mutations at one time.156 Therefore, instead of asking
whether an individual has a mutation in gene X, one could theoretically
screen that person’s entire genome at once for all known mutations. The
problem is that separate patent owners, not unlike Myriad, would own
most of these mutations. Although the previous section argued that gene
patents have not created a patent thicket that is significantly hindering
innovation,157 genome-wide diagnostic DNA arrays could create an
anticommons effect in the near future.
[41] If the GRDAA of 2002 had passed, DNA array manufacturers such
as Affymetrix would still have had difficulty manufacturing their arrays
because commercial entities would not have been exempted from
infringement. The result would have been extremely large transaction
costs,158 and is likely the reason that Affymetrix is the only notable
biotechnology company that is actually opposed to gene patents.159 If
similar legislation were to pass that provided infringement exemptions for
commercial entities in addition to noncommercial entities with respect to
genetic diagnostic tests, companies such as Myriad would no longer be
able to monopolize individual genetic mutations, while companies such as
Affymetrix would then be able to manufacture genome-wide genetic
screens. Thus, an infringement exemption for genetic tests that is
inclusive towards commercial entities would not leave innovative
diagnostic arrays undeveloped. Of equal importance, extending a
diagnostic testing exemption to commercial entities would curb an
anticommons effect that might result from genome-wide diagnostic
testing.
[42] Another solution offered to remedy unnecessarily expensive
diagnostic tests involves issuing compulsory licenses of gene patents for
diagnostic tests, which would force patent holders to license their gene
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patent regardless of the patent holder’s desires.160 Compulsory licenses,
however, have never been granted in the United States out of fears that
such licenses will compromise innovation, and are probably only useful in
limited circumstances.161 In effect, compulsory licenses are not realistic
options to ensure adequate access to genetic tests.
[43] Regardless of whether some individuals unfortunately have to pay a
little more for genetic tests, what many opponents of gene patents seem to
miss is that the purpose and benefit of gene patents extend far beyond the
simple development of diagnostic tests. Gene patent critics have asserted
that gene discovery does not require the same incentive to innovate as
drug discovery.162 Yet these assertions confuse the patent policy designed
to promote incentive to innovate with the incentive to discover genes.
[44] In reality, most gene patent claims are not methods intended to
diagnose genetic disorders.163 On the contrary, gene patents have
160

Betti, supra note 12, at 26. See generally Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts
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provided the necessary incentive to innovate many drugs currently on the
market that simply would not exist without such patents.164 Moreover,
because many individuals choose not to be tested for genetic disorders out
of fear of genetic discrimination,165 and further considering the fact that
the reliability of many genetic tests is questionable,166 one should wonder
how critical genetic tests really are to public health. The remainder of this
article will demonstrate that not only are diagnostic tests a small subset of
products that arise out of gene patents, but also that therapeutic drugs that
are arguably more valuable to society depend heavily on the existence of
such patents.
IV.

GENE PATENTS ARE CRITICAL FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY DRUG
DEVELOPMENT

[45] Before the criticisms and subsequent counterarguments relating to
the necessities of gene patenting are addressed, a basic understanding of
the essential nature of patents as they relate to pharmaceutical drug
innovation shall be discussed. This paradigm can then be extended to the
biotechnology industry. Similar to small molecule pharmaceutical drug
discovery, patents containing gene sequences will provide crucial
incentives for biologic drug discovery.

have the word “human” in their claims, the total number of gene patents that claim
methods for human genetic diagnostic testing is likely to be closer to around 2-3%.
Importantly, it must further be stressed that the patents examined that do claim methods
for diagnosing human genetic disorders almost always claimed non-diagnostic methods,
including therapeutic applications. This fact further substantiates the argument posited
by this article that gene patents have numerous applications beyond mere diagnostic
testing for genetic mutations. While such approximations lack scientific precision, it
nonetheless demonstrates the notion that diagnostic tests comprise only a fraction of all
inventions claimed by gene patents. See DNA Patent Database,
http://dnapatents.georgetown.edu/search/searchadvdnag.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2008).
164
See infra Part IV.B.
165
See generally Paul Steven Miller, Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 26 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 189 (1998) (discussing potential consequences of discrimination
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A. THE NECESSITY OF PATENTS IS WELL ESTABLISHED FOR
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION
[46] Patent law in the United States is enabled by the U.S. Constitution,
and is intended “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”167 The intent of the patent
system is simple—to encourage innovation.168
Patents encourage
169
afforded by patents
innovation because the period of exclusivity
provides financial incentive for inventors “to engage in desirable
behavior.”170 More importantly, this period of exclusivity promotes
innovation by allowing an inventor to recoup the costs of researching and
developing a product without any concern that an innovative product will
be exploited by free riders who did not have to invest in the necessary
research and development.171 As a result, it is probably fair to say that as
more investment is required for research and development for any given
invention, periods of exclusivity become more critical in order to provide
incentive to innovate. Patents further benefit the public by encouraging
disclosure.172 Inventors and the public reach a bargain so that inventors
receive a private right in the form of a patent in exchange for public
disclosure of inventions.173
[47] Patent protection is particularly critical for the incentive to innovate
pharmaceutical drug therapies.
In the context of this article,
pharmaceutical drugs are “conventional drugs,” which are small molecule,
chemically synthesized compounds that are claimed by chemical
composition patents, not gene patents.174 Exclusive patent rights are more
167
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critical to the pharmaceutical industry than most other industries because
research and development costs are extremely expensive and timeconsuming.175 Incredibly, the cost of bringing a single pharmaceutical
drug to market, which can take up to fifteen years, ranges between $800
million to $1.7 billion.176 Arguably, a pharmaceutical company will not
put forth that large of an investment risk without the assurance that those
costs can be recovered.
[48] The necessity of patent exclusivity for pharmaceutical drugs has
been the center of much debate. Some patent advocates have suggested
that in light of the fact that a large portion of a drug’s patent term is caught
up in pre-clinical and clinical trials, “[t]he twenty-year life of a patent
from the time of application is a very short window within which a
drugmaker may recoup its research and development costs.”177 In
contrast, some critics have asserted that patents are unnecessary because
the large expenditures on marketing demonstrate that pharmaceutical
companies do not need a period of exclusivity to recover research and
development costs.178 Arguments such as the latter misconstrue causal
sufficiency with necessity. The only reason why the capital exists to
market the drug is because a patent allowed for the development of the
drug in the first place. Without patents, not only would marketing cease,
but development of new drugs would as well.
[49] While it may be true that some blockbuster drugs have provided
handsome profits for the drug companies, such drugs are few and far
between. Additionally, the exclusivity term associated with a patent
further allows for the recovery of the development costs for potential
drugs that never reach the market. On average, only one out of every 5000
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to 10,000 screened compounds becomes an approved drug.179 Though
society pays upfront by allowing a pharmaceutical drugmaker exclusive
control of the drug at first, society ultimately benefits as a result of being
provided with the innovated product.
B. BIOLOGICS CURRENTLY ON THE MARKET REQUIRED GENE PATENTS
[50] Bioethicists have asserted that “while patents on certain products
related to health care are appropriate—such as patents on drugs—the
rationales for granting such patents do not apply to patents on genes.”180
These opponents will further proclaim that “[t]he discovery of genes does
not require the same commercial incentives as drug development.”181
These assertions could not be further from the truth, especially considering
the fact that patents claiming methods for diagnosing human genetic
disorders comprise only a fraction of the total uses resulting from gene
patents.182 In actuality, gene patents do require the same commercial
incentives as drug development because gene patents are required for drug
development—biologic drug development.
[51] Biologics, also known as biopharmaceuticals, are essentially drugs
that are biological products derived from a living organism or cell, or by
recombinant DNA technology.183 Thus, as opposed to conventional small
molecule drugs that are a result of chemical composition patents, biologics
are drugs that are usually protected by gene patents. Biologics are also
drugs that would be negatively affected by the GRAA. Examples of
biologics on the market are growth factors, monoclonal antibodies,
hormones, cytokines, fusion proteins, blood factors, recombinant enzymes,
recombinant vaccines, anticoagulants, and nucleic acids.184 Biologics are
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used to treat a variety of disorders including but not limited to: cancer,
AIDS, influenza, hepatitis, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease.185
[52] Sales of biologics are extremely significant for the drug market and
are not dwarfed by conventional drugs. In 2006, biologics brought in over
$30 billion in sales in the United States.186 In 2007, 42% of all products in
world-wide preclinical testing were protein-based biologics.187 As of
2001, there were 1,457 biotechnology companies in the United States
alone.188 Furthermore, biologics are expected to continue to have a
significant role as drug therapies.189 Biologics experienced an annual
growth rate of 20% between 2001 and 2006, although during the same
time period, conventional pharmaceuticals in the United States only
experienced an annual growth rate of 6-8%.190 Thus, a significant
proportion of drug therapies that are potentially available to the public
consist of biologic drug therapies.
[53] The incentive required to research and develop a biologic drug is no
less than it would be for a traditional pharmaceutical drug. In actuality, it
is more. Because of the “greater complexity in their manufacture,
biologics typically cost much more than chemically synthesized, smallmolecule drugs.”191 Similar to conventional drugs, biopharmaceutical
manufacturers will not even consider investing in the research and
development required to bring a biologic to market without the guarantee
that their investing expenditures can be recovered.192 Similarly, as
opposed to “big-pharma,” many biotechnology companies are start-ups
requiring venture capital in order to innovate their biologics. In 2007,
over $7 billion in venture capital was invested in biotechnology start-
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ups.193 In order to secure venture capital, bioentrepreneurs absolutely
must obtain patent protection over their biological product.194
[54] Biologics are not without unique issues, usually pertaining to
whether biosimilar generic drugs can be safely manufactured. Most
biologics are currently regulated by and require approval under the Public
Health Service Act (“PHSA”).195 For conventional drugs, the Food and
Drug Administration (“FDA”) abbreviates approval for generic drugs
under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”).196 In
contrast, the PHSA does not expressly provide a mechanism for
abbreviated approval of a biologic.197 As a result, most biologics
unfortunately do not have generic counterparts following expiration of the
respective drug’s patent term.198 Nonetheless, there is much debate as to
whether the FDA can and should approve generic biologics under the
FDCA regardless of whether the biologic was originally approved under
the PHSA.199 Pioneers argue that the FDA should not approve generic
biologics.200 This is because unlike conventional small molecule drugs,
“biological sources cannot be accurately characterized or reliably
produced.”201 Current legislation, however, would provide the FDA with
express authority to abbreviate approval of a biologic drug.202 This
complicated debate is important to note. Because generics do not exist for
most biologics, many biopharmaceutical drug makers are receiving a de
facto patent term extension.203 This could result in higher costs to
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patients, insurance companies, health plan providers, and taxpayers.204
Although ultimately outside the scope of this article, legislation that would
provide a mechanism to bring safe and affordable generic biologics to all
patients should be vigorously supported and subsequently adopted.
[55] The impact biologics have on the drug market simply cannot be
ignored. Because biologics are industrially more complicated than
conventional drugs, unique issues persist. Like all recently introduced
technologies, the biotechnology industry still requires the fine-tuning
necessary to provide the most efficient drugs possible. At any rate, it
appears as though biologics are steadily becoming more prominent in the
repertoire of drug therapies available to society. As a result, such
technologies should be vigorously pursued and not compromised at the
expense of a limited number of diagnostic genetic tests.
V. A BAN ON GENE PATENTS WOULD PREVENT RECENT ADVANCES IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY FROM MATERIALIZING
[56] This article has thus far demonstrated the critical role patents play in
bringing biotechnological innovation to market.
Without patents,
biotechnology companies would likely rely solely on trade secrets.205 This
would result in severely reduced instances of innovative advancement for
all biotechnologies requiring substantial investment costs.206 Opponents
of gene patents that have failed to appreciate this reality have further failed
to appreciate that emerging biotechnologies that may benefit society will
fail to innovate without robust patent protection. While no one can predict
exactly what technological innovation the future holds, this section will
exemplify just two emerging biotechnologies that surely would be harmed
by passage of the GRAA: RNAi and synthetic biology.
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A. RNAI
[57] One biologic drug therapy necessitating gene patents, which is
expected to reach the market in coming years, centers around the
technology known as RNA interference (“RNAi”). RNAi is employed in
nature by many organisms from fungi to mammals and it functions as a
natural mechanism to silence gene activity.207 RNAi was first coined by
Andrew Fire and his colleagues, who discovered that injection of doublestranded RNA into the nematode C. elegans interfered with the function of
the endogenous gene corresponding to the specific RNA sequence that
was injected into the worm.208 This discovery allowed scientists to
harness this naturally occurring mechanism in order to develop an easy
and specific method to manipulate gene expression.209
[58]
Being able to manipulate gene expression has tremendous
therapeutic benefits. In addition to its research applications, RNAi has a
potentially therapeutic role benefiting “a wide variety of diseases,
including malignant, infectious and autoimmune diseases.”210
Furthermore, RNAi is desirable because it reduces side-effects and
secondary harm by utilizing naturally occurring mechanisms.211
One of the current difficulties with RNAi technology is that the progress
that has been made in understanding siRNA212 in vitro in mammalian cell
lines has not necessarily translated to in vivo activity.213 The greatest
207
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hurdle is currently with drug delivery.214 Nonetheless, there already exists
“[t]hree different RNAi therapeutics [that] are currently under clinical
investigation, with several more poised to enter trials soon.”215 The
earliest clinical applications of RNAi are for respiratory syncytial virus
(RSV) infection and age-related macular degeneration (AMD).216
[59] In spite of the uncertainties of RNAi, the technology is rapidly
advancing. In 2006, there was a 170% increase over 2005 in RNAi
patents issued.217 RNAi is further expected to contribute significantly to
the breadth of biologics available, and new RNAi-focused market entrants
are joining the biotechnology industry monthly.218 Additionally, Merck
bought a RNAi-focused company known as Sirna Therapeutics for $1.1
billion in 2006.219 Patents are undoubtedly fueling the explosion of RNAi
technology. Like DNA, RNA is composed of nucleotide sequences.
Thus, patents claiming compositions or methods associated with RNAi
would unfortunately be banned if Congressmen Becerra and Weldon’s
GRAA becomes law.
B. SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
[60] Synthetic biology is another emerging biotechnology whose success
will ultimately depend on the acceptance of gene patents. Synthetic
biology is the synthesis of biologically based and complex systems that do
not display functions that exist in nature.220 Synthetic biology has
numerous beneficial applications, including the potential production of
unlimited and inexpensive supplies of medically relevant drugs for
diseases such as malaria.221 Synthetic biology has environmental
applications as well, more particularly with respect to biodiesel
214
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production, which aims to lessen the environmental impact of producing
these fuels.222 Because high lipid content is a desirable trait for biodiesel
production, synthetic genome production could create microorganisms
with all the necessary lipid production pathway genes in order to regulate
highly efficient lipid production.223
[61] Synthetic biology is making rapid advances. In early 2008, the first
bacterial genome was successfully synthesized.224 The synthesized
genome is comprised of 582,970 nucleotide base pairs and was modeled
after the bacterium Mycoplasma genitalium.225 Like many areas of
biotechnology, synthetic biology is not without criticism. Previously
raised concerns include suggestions that rogue states or terrorist
organizations might use such technologies for bioterrorism.226 Such
concerns are completely legitimate and deserve careful scrutiny. A
comparison of the advantages of such technology to the possible negative
effects and questions as to whether synthetic biology deserves to be
vigorously pursued, however, should be debated elsewhere. If critics of
synthetic biology desire leverage to attain their goals, the patent system is
not the proper forum. This article has already demonstrated that gene
patents are unfairly targeted as causes of some of the possible negative
effects of intellectual property protection, even though most of these
putatively negative side effects are not even specific to gene patents.227
The potential advances synthetic biology can make towards public health
and the environment could be enormous, and must not be sacrificed at the
expense of far-reaching legislation that is ultimately targeted towards
problems, which in reality are relatively insignificant.
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VI. CONCLUSION
[62] The GRAA sponsored by Congressmen Becerra and Weldon is
unnecessary and would have ruinous effects on health care and possibly
even the environment. Gene patents are not compromising basic research
and commercial innovation. While it may be true that development of
diagnostic tests is inexpensive and probably does not demand the same
periods of exclusivity that patent policy affords to other technologies,
diagnostic tests only make up a fraction of the possible uses for gene
patents. Most other applications that depend upon gene patents absolutely
require the patent’s period of exclusivity to ensure innovative incentive.
[63] This article concedes to some degree that patients are sometimes
unfairly forced to pay more for genetic tests than could be provided by
their health care providers. This article further concedes that issues exist
with respect to the high costs of brand-name drugs. Nevertheless, the
GRAA completely oversteps its bounds in addressing issues relevant to
gene patents. A much better solution would be legislation similar to the
GRDAA of 2002 that provides infringement exemptions for noncommercial research and diagnostic testing. Even so, the GRDAA of
2002 was not perfect, as diagnostic testing is experiencing a paradigm
shift such that diagnostic tests will likely exist mostly on genome-wide
arrays in the near future. When this occurs, commercial entities such as
Affymetrix, which would not have been exempt from infringement had the
GRDAA of 2002 passed, might have difficulty maneuvering around the
individual gene patents protecting respective diagnostic tests. If the
GRDAA of 2002 is revived with infringement exemptions for genetic
diagnostic tests that extend to commercial activities, companies will no
longer be able to monopolize tests for individual genetic mutations.
Genome-wide diagnostic array tests, however, would become
commonplace for genetic testing and would not be left undeveloped.
More importantly, such legislation would directly address the pertinent
issues, and would not interfere with the most important and widely used
application of gene patents—biologic drug innovation.
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